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Ilya Somint
Can voters possibly acquire enough information to impose
meaningful democratic control over the activities of the modem state? This
is the fundamental question addressed by Arthur Lupia and Mathew
McCubbins' important new book, The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens
Learn What They Need to Know?'
As one leading scholar puts it, "[n]othing strikes the student of public
opinion and democracy more forcefully than the paucity of information
most people possess about politics."2 The consensus of decades of public
opinion research is that most voters are ignorant of even the most basic
political information,3 including knowledge of which branches of
government control which policies,4 and the meaning of "conservative"
and "liberal" ideologies.' Seventy percent of voters cannot name both of
their state's senators.6 More than a third can be categorized as "know-
nothings" almost completely ignorant of relevant political information, 7
and perhaps no more than five percent are knowledgeable to any
substantial extent.'
Despite this bleak state of affairs, Lupia and McCubbins nonetheless
answer the question they pose in the title of their book in the affirmative.
Their main claim is that voters need not have detailed knowledge in order
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to keep track of public policy because learning can take place even in the
absence of knowledge through implicit "cues" from interest group leaders,
the media, politicians, and others. Such cues can, they claim, enable voters
to grasp the essentials of complex issues without devoting large amounts
of time and effort. While similar claims for the efficacy of various
"shortcuts" to political knowledge have been made before,9 Lupia and
McCubbins develop the argument in a more rigorous and sophisticated
way. They assume that voter control of politicians and legislator control of
bureaucracies can be analyzed as a subset of delegation theory in general.
In the first half of the book, Lupia and McCubbins present a novel theory
of how voter "principals" can learn sufficient information to control their
political "agents" from a few relatively easy-to-follow cues. In the second,
they attempt to substantiate their theory empirically with evidence from
small-group laboratory experiments and surveys. Finally, in the concluding
chapter, the authors summarize the implications of their findings for voter
control of legislatures, legislative control of government bureaucracies,
and even the use of citizen juries in the legal system.
Although the authors' analysis is often interesting and insightful, they
err in failing to come to grips with the key factors that make voting a
particularly difficult principal-agent dilemma. Unlike most principals in
private markets, voters are "rationally ignorant." Since any one vote has
virtually no chance of affecting an electoral outcome, there is little
incentive for the individual voter to acquire sufficient knowledge to vote
"accurately."' 0 Even worse, the immense size and scope of modem
government make it extremely difficult for even very dedicated voters to
acquire enough information about all of the state's important functions to
vote in an informed manner."
Part I of this review analyzes Lupia and McCubbins' principal-agent
model of voter control as it is laid out in the first half of the book. I argue
that their model imposes considerably greater informational burdens on
voters than the authors imply. In Part II, I consider their experimental
evidence. While the data presented by Lupia and McCubbins has
interesting implications, it fails to show that voters can easily acquire
adequate information by using the shortcuts suggested by the authors.
Finally, Part III critiques some of the policy implications presented in their
final chapter. Here too, Lupia and McCubbins are overly optimistic about
9 See, e.g., MORRIS P. FIORINA, RETROSPECTIVE VOTING IN AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS (1981); V.0. KEY, THE RESPONSIBLE ELECTORATE: RATIONALITY IN PRESIDENTIAL
VOTING, 1936-1960 (1966); BENJAMIN I. PAGE & ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO, THE RATIONAL PUBLIC: FIFTY
YEARS OF TRENDS IN AMERICANS' POLICY PREFERENCES (1992); SAMUEL L. POPKIN, THE
REASONING VOTER: COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION IN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS (1991).
10 See ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY ch. 13 (1957).
11 This is one of the themes of my own recent work. See Ilya Somin, Voter Ignorance and
the Democratic Ideal, 12 CRIT. REV. 413 (1999).
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the extent to which shortcuts can alleviate the knowledge burden on voters.
As a result, their policy proposals go well beyond what the evidence they
present would justify.
I. The Model
Lupia and McCubbins' key insight is that a person seeking to make a
rational decision between two or more alternatives need not actually have
detailed knowledge of each option; instead, they merely need to be able to
"predict the consequences of actions."12 This seemingly obvious
deduction, the authors argue, has important implications. It suggests that
voters can potentially learn which political leaders and public policies are
likely to serve their interests best without actually knowing much about
them.
Unlike many previous defenders of shortcuts to adequate political
knowledge, 3 Lupia and McCubbins precisely specify the criteria that voter
knowledge must meet if it is to be adequate to the needs of what they call
"reasoned choice."' 4 In order to be able to predict the consequences of
alternative policy choices without having detailed specific knowledge,
voters must be able to find sources of information that are (1)
knowledgeable, and (2) have an incentive to tell the truth. 5 They refer to
these two characteristics of information sources as the "knowledge
condition" and the "incentives condition" respectively.' 6 In cases where
both conditions can be met, Lupia and McCubbins "reject the conclusion
that people who lack information are incapable of reasoned choice."' 7
Indeed, in such situations, acquiring additional information about "details"
of policy might be simply wasteful, since the necessary effort will not be
worth the cost.'8 If external sources of information that meet both
conditions are available, voters can use this knowledge not only to make
policy choices but also to enforce effectively such decisions on politicians
and bureaucrats whose activities they know little about; 9 trustworthy
information sources (i.e., sources that meet the two preconditions) such as
interest group leaders and political activists can inform voters if the
delegated powers are not being used to serve their interests.20 Here, Lupia
and McCubbins' theory is similar to earlier claims that voters can cut
12 LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 1, at 6 (emphasis in original).
13 See, e.g., FIORINA, supra note 9; POPKIN, supra note 9.
14 LuPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 1, at 17.
15 See id. at 12.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 18.
18 See id. at 25.
19 See id. at 89-93.
20 See id. at ch. 5.
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down on information costs by following cues given by "opinion leaders.",2'
Yet it improves on them by precisely specifying the circumstances under
which information from opinion leaders is likely to be useful.
Perhaps because of the focus in the political science literature on the
possibility that ignorant voters may be deceived by unscrupulous
politicians and demagogues, 22 Lupia and McCubbins spend much more
space discussing the incentives condition than the knowledge condition.
They argue that this condition can be met if either (1) the voters (referred
to as "principals") have common interests with information providers
("speakers"), (2) the principals can verify the accuracy of the speakers'
statements after the fact, or (3) the speakers will suffer a sufficiently
severe penalty for lying that they will be deterred from doing so.
2 3
Furthermore, the authors suggest, voters can sometimes gain accurate
information even from sources that do not meet the incentive precondition
at all. For instance, a Democrat listening to a speech by Newt Gingrich to
his supporters can infer that Gingrich is knowledgeable about the issues he
is addressing and is probably not lying to his supporters because they have
common interests. 24 Assuming that the Democratic listener sees Gingrich
as having interests opposed to her own, Gingrich's expression of support
for certain policies in the speech is a cue for the listener to adopt the
opposite position!25 Similarly, the fact that Gingrich or other highly placed
political leaders are willing to make "costly efforts" to advance their
positions on a given issue is a signal of that issue's importance to the
electorate.26
Lupia and McCubbins' model of adequate knowledge is simple and
appealing; however, many of its implications undercut their optimistic
conclusion that it provides a way for voters to make "reasoned choices"
with little or no information.2' First, an important implication of their
model is that voters must actually find knowledgeable information sources
on all the issues that interest them. Although Lupia and McCubbins tend to
downplay the significance of the knowledge prerequisite in their analysis,
this is no trivial task when one considers the vast range of issues that fall
within the purview of modern government. The federal government alone
has fourteen cabinet-level departments and sixty-one independent
21 See, e.g., POPKIN, supra note 9; James A. Stimson, A Macro Theory of Information Flow,
in INFORMATION AND DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES, supra note 2, at 345.
22 See, e.g., JOHN R. ZALLER, THE NATURE AND ORIGINS OF MASS OPINION (1992); cf.
KEY, supra note 9, at 7-8 (raising and rejecting the conventional argument that voters are "fools"
easily manipulated by "devilishly skilled propogandists").
23 See LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 1, at 53-59.
24 Lupia and McCubbins' book went to press before Speaker Gingrich's resignation in
November 1998.
25 See id. at 61.
26 See id. at 58-60.
27 See id. at 18.
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regulatory agencies covering issues as diverse as agriculture subsidies,
health policy, and nuclear energy.28
In theory, a voter may be able to truncate the search for information
sources by finding a single source that is knowledgeable about a wide
range of issues. In practice, however, it is difficult, if not impossible, for
one source to be well-informed about the full range of public policy issues.
Moreover, reliance on a single source magnifies the impact of any biases
or other shortcomings that source might have. A necessary prerequisite for
seeking out information sources is knowledge that the issues about which
one needs to be informed actually exist. Yet voters are often completely
unaware of vast portions of governmental activity.29
The search for knowledgeable information sources is further
complicated by the insignificance of the individual vote, which gives
voters little incentive to seek out the information necessary to make a
"correct" decision.3° Since any one vote has only an infinitesimally low
chance of determining an electoral outcome, voters are likely to be
"rationally ignorant," unwilling to devote large amounts of time to the
acquisition of information on a decision which has little chance of having
any effect. This inherent shortcoming of voting, well known since
Anthony Downs' pioneering work in the 1950s,3 is not integrated into
Lupia and McCubbins' analytical framework. Yet, while searching for
reliable sources of information on policy outcomes is presumably less
costly than studying the details of policy for oneself, it is by no means
easy. Given the vast range of issues involved, it may well require more
effort than "rationally ignorant" voters are willing to devote.
Even in the unlikely event that voters are willing and able to seek out
information sources on the full range of important issues, it is not
necessarily the case that they will be able to differentiate between those
who are knowledgeable and those who are not.32 Such differentiation
requires either an ability to assess the sources' qualifications as experts or
some knowledge of their track record. Neither can be taken for granted
where voters are as severely ignorant as surveys show the American
electorate to be.33 In assessing public policy, there are few feedback
mechanisms that allow voters to easily assess the past performance of
either political leaders or purveyors of information about their activities.
Even with respect to the incentive prerequisite, to which Lupia and
28 See Somin, supra note 11,at 431.
29 See generally DELLI CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 3, at 62-104 (documenting extensive
voter ignorance on numerous issues).
30 See DOWNS, supra note 10, at ch. 13.
31 See id.
32 For an example of how Lupia and McCubbins' own research places this proposition into
doubt, see infra Part 11.
33 See supra notes 3-8 and accompanying text.
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McCubbins devote greater attention than to the knowledge condition, their
analysis tends to underestimate the difficulty of the voters' task. Under
Lupia and McCubbins' framework, a voter assessing the reliability of an
information source needs to know. if he and the source have common
interests and, if not, whether the source has any other incentive to tell the
truth.34 Neither is easily determined without at least some substantial
background information about the issue at hand and/or the source itself.
Furthermore, Lupia and McCubbins ignore the possibility that politicians
and other information sources can adopt an assortment of strategies to
make their efforts at deception more effective.
Lupia and McCubbins' example of Gingrich and his listeners nicely
illustrates these complicating factors. Their key assumption is that the
Democratic listener has already determined that she and Gingrich have
opposed interests. Yet such a determination cannot be made without
knowing something about how both Gingrich's interests and one's own are
likely to be furthered or undermined by alternative policy options.
Obviously, the voter can try to rely on external information sources to tell
her whether Gingrich's interests are aligned with hers. Yet this strategy
raises the same issues of credibility with respect to those sources as arose
with Gingrich himself.
Second, even if the voter has been able to come to the accurate
conclusion that Gingrich's interests are opposed to her own, Lupia and
McCubbins' theory ignores the possibility that Gingrich himself is also
aware that listeners with opposed interests are scanning his speeches.
Knowing this fact, Gingrich can, for instance, adopt a deliberate strategy
of expressing views more moderate than those he really holds in order to
mislead these hostile listeners-a common enough political tactic.35 In the
extreme case, he might even choose to communicate with key supporters
in secret in order to avoid unwanted attention from potential opponents.
Similar strategic maneuvers might undercut the usefulness to voters
of "costly signaling." If politicians and activists realize that voters,
following the strategy suggested by Lupia and McCubbins, ascribe special
importance to those issues to which they have devoted substantial time and
resources, they can respond by devoting resources to issues that may be of
great significance to themselves or to well-placed interests, but of little
moment to most voters. A notable real-world example of this strategy can
be seen in the periodic bursts of attention that political elites devote to the
trade deficit, an issue of great importance to industries threatened by
34 See LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 1, at 54-55.
35 This is the opposite of the strategy of "position-taking"--endorsing positions that an
officeholder has little desire or ability to actually implement in order to galvanize supporters. For a
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foreign competition but one that-according to the consensus view of
economists-has no real impact on the welfare of the population at large.36
The point is not that such strategies are necessarily effective-they
did not, in the end, save Gingrich, after all-but instead that the possibility
of their use introduces complications that are not captured by Lupia and
McCubbins' model. Obviously, every social scientific model necessarily
abstracts from at least some aspects of reality,3 7 but the authors' failure to
include a factor that seems so integral to the question they address at least
requires some defense.
A deeper objection to the argument Lupia and McCubbins derive
from the Gingrich example is that it conflates two possible sources of
disagreement between opposing sides in a political controversy. In some
instances, political adversaries may disagree because they genuinely have
differing ends; for instance, critics and defenders of abortion disagree as to
whether the rights and interests of the fetus should take precedence over
those of the pregnant woman.38 In such a case, partisans of one side may
be well-served by applying the Lupia-McCubbins strategy of reflexively
taking positions opposite to those put forward by the other side.
In the case of another wide class of issues, however, opposing
partisans disagree over means rather than ends. Conservatives and liberals,
for instance, may both genuinely want to alleviate poverty, but still differ
greatly on the question of how this can be accomplished.39 In such a
situation, reflexively opposing the positions taken by one of the sides may
prevent the voter from giving adequate consideration to an alternative,
perhaps superior, means of achieving goals he himself shares. The Lupia-
McCubbins strategy, therefore, is useful only in the context of disputes
over ends, and it is positively dangerous in cases of disputes over means.
An additional complication is that it is often difficult to tell whether a
dispute is over means or ends, and unscrupulous partisans may attempt to
discredit opponents by portraying them as actively opposed to a group's
ends even when they merely wish to propose a new means of achieving
them.a°
In light of these difficulties, an alternative interpretation of the Lupia-
36 For a discussion of this and other similar fallacies ubiquitous in the public debate over
trade policy, see PAUL R, KRUGMAN, POP INTERNATIONALISM (1996).
37 See generally Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN
POSITIVE ECONOMICS 3 (1953).
38 See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (1990).
39 For a discussion of contrasting liberal and conservative approaches to the problem of
poverty, see LAWRENCE M. MEAD, THE NEW POLITICS OF POVERTY: THE NONWORKING POOR IN
AMERICA (1992).
40 See Glenn C. Loury, Self-Censorship in Public Discourse: A Theory of Political
Correctness and Related Phenomena, 6 RATIONALITY & SOC. 428 (1994) (arguing that stands on
purely instrumental issues may often be turned into litmus tests of a political actor's commitment to a
group's fundamental goals).
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McCubbins model of voter decision-making is not that "people who lack
information" can still make "reasoned choices," but that information about
the knowledge and trustworthiness of key political elites can substitute for
information about the substance of specific policies. Although there is as
yet little empirical evidence to support such an assertion, it is plausible to
assume that the former sort of information is easier to acquire and
understand than the latter. Much less compelling are the further
assumptions that information about knowledge and trustworthiness is
easily acquired in an absolute rather than a relative sense and that adequate
information about such matters is currently possessed by most of the
electorate. Lupia and McCubbins have highlighted a new path to political
knowledge. They have not, however, been able to show that it is an easy
path, or even that it is clearly less difficult than the alternatives.
II. Experimental and Survey Evidence
In Chapters 6-9 of The Democratic Dilemma, Lupia and McCubbins
present experimental and survey evidence that they claim supports their
theory. To demonstrate that the knowledge and incentives preconditions
really do have an impact on real-world decision-making, the authors
performed a series of experiments in which one test subject observed coin
tosses and another did not. The informed subject (the "speaker" in the
book's terminology) then had the option of reporting what he saw
accurately to his partner (the "principal") or of trying to deceive her. The
latter, in turn, had to make a statement as to what he thought the true result
was. In some variations of the experiment, the speaker and the principal
were given "common interests"--that is, both were paid on the basis of
how accurate the principal's statements of the outcomes of the coin tosses
were.4 1 In others, the speaker was given an incentive to deceive his partner,
and in still others the speaker and listener were given opposed incentives,
but with a penalty imposed on the speaker for lying.42 Other variations on
the basic experimental design tested the hypotheses of "costly signaling"
and showed that the principals were unlikely to follow the speakers'
recommendations where the latter lacked knowledge of the coin toss
outcomes.43
There is no need here to review all the authors' ingenious variations
on their basic experimental design. It is sufficient to note that the results
strongly bore out their prediction that principals were far more likely to
believe and act on the speakers' statements when the latter were perceived
as both knowledgeable and as having an incentive to reveal the truth than
41 See LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 1, at 109.
42 See id.
43 See id. at 103.
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when one or both of these factors was absent.4 In and of itself, this
experimental result is difficult to question and is in fact what we would
intuitively expect to occur. What is much less clear is the applicability of
Lupia and McCubbins' results to real-world voting and delegation, the
phenomena they wish to shed light on.
Unfortunately, the authors' experimental design fails to capture
several key difficulties that bedevil actual voting. Most fundamentally, the
experiment addresses only the question of whether or not principals will
vary their confidence in speakers depending on how knowledgeable and
trustworthy they are perceived to be. It does not address what, as we saw
in Part I, is the more difficult real-world question: whether voters can
accurately gauge knowledge and trustworthiness itself.45 In most versions
of the Lupia-McCubbins experimental design, the principals were simply
told whether or not the speakers were knowledgeable and also what kind
of incentive they had to lie or tell the truth.46 Tellingly, however, the
authors did run one experimental trial in which the principals were told
that they and the speakers had common interests even though they actually
did not.47 In this scenario, the principals accepted the speakers' advice just
as they did in those cases where there was a real commonality of
interests.48
A second key limitation of the experiment is that the principals were
required to acquire information on only one easily understood "issue"-
the outcomes of a set of coin tosses. Informed voting in an election, of
course, requires dealing simultaneously with a large number of issues,
many of them quite complex. Thus, the ability of Lupia and McCubbins'
test subjects to make "reasoned" choices under highly favorable conditions
does not show that voters could do so under the much more difficult
conditions of real-world politics.
Finally, the applicability of the Lupia-McCubbins experiment is
limited by its failure to replicate the collective action problems that arise in
elections. In the experiment, the principals and speakers received monetary
payments based purely on the success of their individual actions, without
reference to the acts of others. In an election, by contrast, a "correct"
voting decision by an individual voter creates no benefits for him except in
the extremely rare circumstance where it determines the outcome of an
election. Thus, the voter, unlike Lupia and McCubbins' test subjects, has
little incentive to seek out information or even consider the issues
logically. This critical difference between Lupia and McCubbins'
44 See id.
45 See supra text accompanying notes 27-39.
46 See id. at 115.
47 See id. at 130-32.
48 Seeid. at 132.
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experimental subjects and real-world voters makes it difficult to
extrapolate from the behavior of the former to the latter.
In Chapter 9, the authors attempt to supplement their experimental
findings with evidence from survey data. A representative sample of
respondents was asked whether or not they believed increased spending for
prison construction to be a "good idea. ' 49 Some of the respondents were
told that this proposal had been endorsed by conservative talk show host
Rush Limbaugh, while others were informed that it was supported by
liberal host Phil Donahue. Still others were told that it was opposed by one
of these two luminaries, and a control group was asked the question
without any reference to either host.50
Lupia and McCubbins posited that those respondents who both agreed
with Limbaugh or Donahue "all" or "most" of the time and perceived them
as knowledgeable about the issue at hand, would be more likely to align
their views with those attributed to their favored talk show hosti'
Conversely, those who stated that they disagreed with the host in question
all or most of the time were expected to differ with his supposed views on
prison construction as well. The authors argue that a host who is a
perceived as both knowledgeable and sharing common values with the
respondent meets their knowledge and incentives prerequisites for being a
trustworthy source of information. 2 Therefore, if the respondents behave
as predicted, Lupia and McCubbins' theory would receive a degree of
empirical confirmation.
The authors did indeed find that respondents who perceived
Limbaugh or Donahue as knowledgeable and agreed with him "all or
most" of the time were more likely to endorse his position on prison
construction. 3 More interestingly, they also found that those who
disagreed with the host in question all or most of the time were also
disproportionately likely to reject his views on prisons as well. 54 This
conclusion provides support for their hypothesis that voters may derive
useful clues from the statements of opposing political activists and leaders.
Although the survey analysis has a few minor methodological
shortcomings, 55 it does provide somewhat more powerful evidence for the
49 See id. at 187.
50 For a detailed description of this survey, see id. at 186-90.
51 See id. at 188.
52 See id. at 189-90.
53 See id. at 192-95.
54 See id. at 192-93.
55 For example, as hinted at in Part 1, "agreeing" with Limbaugh or Donahue most of the
time is not necessarily the same thing as having common interests with them in the sense that Lupia
and McCubbins define as necessary to meet their incentive precondition. One can, for instance, agree
with Limbaugh's or Donahue's ends but disagree with them on the means, or vice versa. Lupia and
McCubbins' definition presumably requires agreement on ends, for the whole point of seeking
information sources in their theory is to find the most effective means. It is difficult to say to what
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authors' hypothesis than does the coin experiment. Unlike the latter, it
deals with a real and complex issue, and the information sources involved
are real public personalities. Unfortunately, however, it still suffers from
some of the same shortcomings. Like the experimental evidence, the
surveys do not in any way show that voters are capable of finding
information sources that really are knowledgeable and trustworthy-only
that they believe those sources that appear to be so. Indeed, it is significant
that a large proportion of the survey respondents thought that Donahue and
Limbaugh really were knowledgeable about the somewhat esoteric issue of
new prison construction and were willing to be guided by their stance.
With due respect to Messers Donahue and Limbaugh, it is not likely that
they really do possess the necessary expertise to give informed advice on
this issue. On this point, it would seem, the survey evidence undercuts
Lupia and McCubbins' optimistic view of voter knowledge rather than
strengthens it.
A second implication of the Limbaugh-Donahue survey that cuts
against Lupia and McCubbins is that it exemplifies the confusion of ends
and means described in Part I. It seems unlikely that either Limbaugh or
Donahue opposes the goal that new prison construction is alleged to
serve-that of reducing crime. If they disagree over the issue, it is likely
because they have differing views as to the means by which this goal is
best achieved. In this respect, the willingness of voters to reflexively
accept or reject their positions based on their general political sympathies
may be a positively ineffective strategy of sorting political information,
leading voters to support or reject a policy option solely because of
disagreements with its advocates over other issues.
III. Policy Implications
Lupia and McCubbins contend that their findings have important
implications for public policy and the design of political institutions. 6 In
general, they arrive at the optimistic assessment that voters are able to
make informed choices even though "it is indisputable that they know little
of the details of politics and government. ' 7 Voters, the authors claim, can
find knowledgeable and trustworthy sources of information among
political parties, interest groups, and others involved in the political
degree-if any-this problem skews their results. A second minor flaw is that the authors did not
check to see if the respondents were aware of Limbaugh's and Donahue's respective political
orientations. Thus, we do not know whether an expression of "agreement" with the views of these
hosts really represents a considered commitment to liberalism or conservatism or not. If it does not,
this makes it more likely that "agreement" does not truly indicate a sense of common interests of the
sort required by Lupia and McCubbins' incentive prerequisite.
56 See LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note l,at ch. 10.
57 See id. at 205.
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process.58 They also extend the logic of their argument to other political
institutions where principals with highly limited information seek to
control much better-informed agents, including legislative oversight of
bureaucracy and the use of lay juries to assess complex cases. 59 Here too,
the ability to seek external information sources is said to make up for lack
of knowledge.
Unfortunately, Lupia and McCubbins' analysis fails to provide
adequate foundations for these broad assertions. While the ability to use
information from knowledgeable and trustworthy sources may cut down
on information costs for voters and others, it by no means eliminates the
substantial cost of identifying the needed sources-which itself may
require considerable knowledge. Nor does it eliminate the collective action
problems and strategic maneuvering by political leaders that further
complicate the voters' task.
Lupia and McCubbins are perhaps on firmer ground in their
discussion of legislative oversight of bureaucracy than in their analysis of
their central topic of voting.60 The information asymmetry between
legislators and bureaucrats is presumably much smaller than that between
voters and politicians. Legislators are likely to have considerable
experience and skill in identifying knowledgeable and trustworthy
information sources on the performance of various agencies. They are also
less likely than voters to suffer from collective action problems that lead
them to be rationally ignorant. Finally, legislators have much greater
power than do voters to restructure the incentives faced by the agents to
whom their power is delegated.61 Even here, it is by no means clear that
legislators are capable of acquiring enough information to control the
sprawling bureaucracy of modern government.62 If they are, it is likewise
an open question as to how much of this success is attributable to the
causes posited by Lupia and McCubbins' theory. More importantly,
however, the fact that legislators can control bureaucrats may be of little
consolation if the legislators themselves cannot be controlled by voters
because they lack the necessary knowledge. In such a scenario, legislative
dominance over the bureaucracy may be used to promote the goals of
strategically placed interest groups at the expense of the general public.63
58 See id. at 206-08.
59 See id. at 209-25.
60 See LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 1, at 216-23.
61 See id. at 215-19.
62 For skeptical views, see, e.g., THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE
SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 92-126 (2d ed. 1979); WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR.,
BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971); GORDON TULLOCK, THE POLITICS OF
BUREAUCRACY (1965); Terry M. Moe, An Assessment of the Positive Theory of Congressional
Dominance, 12 LEG. STUD. Q. 475 (1987);
63 For notable statements of the argument that legislation has a tendency to come under the
control of narrow interest groups, see MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE
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Lupia and McCubbins' most original application of their theory is to
the use of citizen juries in trials with complex evidence. 64 Despite recently
increasing skepticism among lawyers and academics about the ability of
jurors to handle complex cases,65 they argue that knowledgeable sources of
information are available to jurors in the form of arguments by counsel and
witness testimony, and that the incentives and interests of these sources
can readily be inferred from their affiliation with one or another party to
the case.66 Yet, as discussed above, the authors' incentive criterion requires
not only that the interests of information sources be known but that they
have an incentive to reveal the truth.67 A juror who listens to presentations
by expert witnesses by both sides in a complex case may know that the
witnesses have an incentive to bend the truth for their clients' benefit, but
this knowledge is of limited utility if he does not have sufficient
background knowledge to determine which parts of the witnesses'
testimony really are lies or exaggerations and which are not. In some
cases, the scientific issues may be so complex that jurors have difficulty
even understanding expert witness testimony, much less assessing it.6' For
these reasons, Lupia and McCubbins' optimism about the utility of lay
juries may be unwarranted.
Conclusion
Lupia and McCubbins' The Democratic Dilemma is a useful addition
to the literature on voter knowledge. The authors' most important
contribution is their explanation of how information about the knowledge
and trustworthiness of political actors may be used as a substitute for direct
knowledge of the details of public policy. Less persuasive is their assertion
that this means of enlightenment can in and of itself allow severely
ignorant voters to make reasoned choices about public policy. As we have
seen, the authors underestimate the knowledge burden imposed by the very
process of finding and identifying knowledgeable and trustworthy
information sources. The Lupia-McCubbins strategy also does little to
defuse the knowledge deficiencies caused by rational ignorance and the
sheer size and scope of the government agenda. The authors' laboratory
and survey data likewise provide only equivocal support for their claims.
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67 See supra text accompanying notes 34-35.
68 For a dramatic example, see JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (1995).
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Despite these criticisms, Lupia and McCubbins have performed a
useful service in identifying an alternative means of redressing the
informational deficiencies of voters and others involved in principal-agent
dilemmas with severely asymmetrical information. Future scholarship
should build on their work and subject their theories to more rigorous and
systematic empirical testing. By this means, we may yet obtain a clearer
answer to the question of whether or not citizens can learn what they need
to know to assert meaningful democratic control over the modern state.
